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Analogic Thinking in Science and Math
Martha D. Patton
Campus Writing Program
325 General Classroom Building
University of Missouri-Columbia
Columbia, Missouri 65211
writmdp@showme.missouri.edu
(573) 884-6221
One of the great pleasures of my position in a nationally known writing-across-the curriculum program is
discovering in many scientists a deep appreciation for
humanistic thinking. The science wars wage on in the
background, and I do find plenty of evidence of rifts
between the “two cultures” that C. P. Snow described
a half century ago. Nonetheless, there are on our campus many mathematicians and scientists who not only
harbor all sorts of artistic talents, but also call upon
their students to use language and to think imaginatively. Long before Professor Dennis Sentilles’ calculus course was formally designated “writing intensive,” he had asked his students to write. That is,
Sentilles recognized the power of language to help
students conceptualize the mathematical procedures
they were working through. His most noteworthy
assignment, now a staple in his writing intensive sections, asks students to compare differential calculus
to a videotaped tennis game. Students use the extended metaphor (see “A Leitmotif for Differential
Calculus,” facing page) to explain the nature and measurement of time and motion and their representations from practical, cognitive, scientific, and mathematical points of view.
Intrigued by this professor’s assignment, I wanted to
review other scientists’ use of analogic thinking and
to investigate, however informally, some students’
responses to analogic thinking. Following is a brief
tour through the history of analogic thinking in science as well as a discussion of analogic thinking as
reported by six students, three from Sentilles’ calculus classes and three from a writing-intensive genetics class that also foregrounds language and imaginative thinking.
SCIENTISTS AND LANGUAGE

Scientists have typically defined scientific writing in
terms of the other: It is not literary. It is not ambigu-
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ous, expressive, personal, or persuasive. It certainly
does not favor metaphor. This prejudice against “literary language” was strong in 1660, when members
of the first British society of scientists denounced “all
amplifications, digressions, and swellings of style”
and called for a return to a “primitive purity” of language. Instead of the “superfluity of talking” that has
“overwhelm’d most other Arts and Professions,” the
new sciences demanded a “naked, natural way of
speaking; positive expressions; clear senses; a native
easiness” (as quoted by Locke 4 and
Bizzell 642).
Three hundred years after the founding of the British
Royal Society, many scientific style manuals still pan
any use of metaphor or figurative language. Sentilles’
use of an extended analogy in calculus might be suspect except for its heuristic or pedagogical value.
Analogies might be useful for communicating something to a broad or popular audience, but many scientists would still argue that analogies have little place
in discovery or in communicating to a specialized
audience. A look at the history of science suggests otherwise, though: analogic thinking has been important
both in the discovery and the communication of
knowledge, as well as in the more obvious role of
teaching. An informal protocol/interview analysis of
six students suggests that analogic thinking may be
valuable, not so much because it bridges old and new
concepts and expedites learning, but because in many
cases it disrupts and slows down learning.
ANALOGIC THINKING IN SCIENCE

Investigations into the role of analogy in science have
not been limited to pedagogy. Philosophers and historians of science have also studied the role of analogy at the points both of scientific discovery and scientific argument or justification. In the nineteenth century, physicist and mathematician Henri Poincaré as-
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A Leitmotif for Differential Calculus
Imagine being out on the tennis court with the ball rising toward you. Differential calculus is the mathematics that
describes and measures change in such an ever changing “time-ball” system. One can use this easily imagined setting
to elucidate a leitmotif for differential calculus along the following conceptual theme line, where f(t) is the height of the
tennis ball at time t:

Computation < ——-— Abstraction < ———— Life/Reality —-— > Cognition
Geometry of Graph

Math Model

Videotape

External Reality

Cognition

Graph of f

The function f

The whole videotape

The path of the ball

The time-ball “system”

One point on the
graph: (t, f(t))

f(t)

Image on frame
taken at time t

Where the ball is at
time t

State at time t

Horizontal axis

Domain of f

Length of time spent
taping (# frames)

How long the ball is
in flight

Duration of events

Vertical axis

Range of f

All frames on the
videotape

All the different
positions of the ball

All individual states
of the system

Vertical increment in
graph

Difference in function
values: f(t+h)-f(t)

Change between
images

How much the ball
rises between two
moments

Change-of-state

Horizontal shift or
increment

Difference in underlying variable: (t+h)-t=h

Time between frames

How much time
changes

Time span

Slope of secant (twopoint) line to the
graph between (t, f(t))
and (t+h, f(t+h))

Average rate of
change:
f (t + h ) − f (t )
h

Slope of tangent line
at the point (t, f(t))

f’(t)=

All tangents to the
graph of f

lim f (t + h ) − f (t )
h→0
h
The derivative of f: f’
as a new function
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Average rate of
change (rise): one’s
sense of motion over
a span of time

Sense of change
between images

How quickly the ball
appears to rise
between two separated moments

Video motion seen at
time t

How fast the ball is
rising at time t

Rate, or change-ofstate, at the moment
t

Viewing the video

The flight of the ball

The motion, or flow,
of the system
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serted that “logic, which alone can give certainty, is
the instrument of demonstration; intuition is the instrument of invention,” and he credited analogy with
being the guide to mathematical invention. The Italian rhetorician Giambattista Vico made similar claims
two hundred years earlier. Many scientists, including
Humphry Davy, Robert Hooke, Johannes Kepler,
Antoine Lavoisier, and Robert Oppenheimer, have
also acknowledged the role of analogy in discovery
or in intuition (Leatherdale). Perhaps the most famous
scientific analogy is Friedrich August Kekule’s account
of dreaming about a serpent biting its own tail just
prior to his discovering the structure of the benzene
ring:
During my stay in Ghent, Belgium, I lived in a
fine room on the main street. I sat in this room
and wrote on my textbook, but could make
no progress—my mind was on other things. I
turned my chair to the fire and sank into a
doze. Again the atoms were gamboling before
my eyes. Little groups kept modestly in the
background. My mind’s eye, trained by the
observation of similar forms, could now distinguish more complex structures of various
kinds. Long chains here and there were firmly
joined; all winding and turning with snakelike motion. Suddenly, one of the serpents
caught its own tail and the ring thus formed
whirled exasperatingly before my eyes. I woke
as by lightning and spent the rest of the night
working out the logical consequences of my
hypothesis (qtd. by Leatherdale 20).
Astonishing as some accounts of analogic thinking are
for scientific discovery, they are less controversial than
the accounts of analogy in scientific argument, particularly in scientific induction. While Aristotle cautioned against argument by analogy (as many logicians have since), Francis Bacon recognized the importance of analogy to scientific argument. John
Maynard Keynes further credits Bacon with distinguishing between positive and false analogies. Twentieth-century philosopher of science Mary Hesse
modifies Bacon’s distinction between positive and
false analogies by examining the positive and false
elements within any given analogy. Within any one
analogy are both positive and negative components.
The predictive power of analogic thinking comes, according to Hesse, from a third element, the part of the
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analogy about which scientists are still undecided.
This distinction is similar to one made by Mike in the
discussion below: students might be irritated by the
false elements of an analogy, but constructively
troubled by a “third element,” the part that slows them
down and causes them to mull over the concept. Few
scientists or philosophers of science deny that analogies offer a heuristic value—in the classroom or in the
profession, but there is less consensus about the necessity of analogy for scientific explanations. Hesse,
among others, argues that analogy is necessary for
scientific argument.
Philosophers have asked parallel questions about the
role of analogy in language. Friedrich Nietzsche’s radical assertion that all language is metaphoric (and,
therefore, analogic) has become commonplace in the
twentieth century. Postmodernists have largely dismissed the cautionary hedge in I. A. Richards’ comment, “Even in the rigid language of the settled sciences we do not eliminate or prevent [metaphor] without great difficulty” (92). I contend that we in the late
1990s need to revisit Richards who, on one hand, denounced “the one and only one meaning superstition”
and boldly asserted that “metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language” and, on the other hand,
recognized greater rigidity and stability in the language of science.
To the degree that philosophers and scientists agree
that metaphor and analogy play a vital role in science,
they aren’t entirely celebratory. Turbayne cautions that
victims of metaphor are trapped unwittingly by prevailing metaphors, much as Thomas Kuhn argues that
the prevailing metaphors in a given paradigm both
shape and limit scientists’ thinking.
However, the “problem” areas of analogies might be
prime sites for “disequilibrium,” Jean Piaget’s term
for the tension between the known and unknown that
motivates leaming—in this case, learning about science and learning about language. This is the concept
that Robert Mayer builds upon in “The Instructive
Metaphor: Metaphoric Aids to Students’ Understanding of Science” (1993).
ANALOGIC THINKING IN NOVICE SCIENTISTS

Mayer is not the first to think about the role of a particular kind of analogy, metaphor, in learning. The
1970’s marked the “cognitive turn” in psychology and
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in “metaphorology,” a time in which psychologists,
cognitive linguists, anthropologists, and literary theorists widely accepted the premise that metaphor is not
just a marker of deviance (genius), as Aristotle believed, but is common (by degree) to all thought. Cognitive linguists explored not only linguistic structures
in a text, but also the ways in which a reader processed
them. In the following quarter of a century,
sociolinguists have called attention to the importance
of context and social relations in discourse.
In a 1994 study of student processing of metaphor,
Understanding Metaphor in Literature, Gerard Steen
analyzes the ways in which students of literature process both potential metaphors (linguistic structures
identified by experts as metaphor) and realized metaphors (cognitive reconstructions of potential metaphors). As a discourse analyst working in the realm
of pragmatics, Steen assumes that the reader, the text,
and the context are all constituents in the study, but
that the reader is at the center of the investigation. He
assumes that a reader’s goals are partly socially determined and that discourse communities share certain regularities and conventions. In this study Steen
attempts to move reception theory from the text to
the reader as a locus of discourse analysis. Steen first
asked students to underline metaphors in a text to see
if students recognized as potential metaphors the same
linguistic structures as those identified by expert readers, in this case a panel of literature professors.
Sharing scholarly debts to pragmatics and discourse
analysis, I wish to explore the relevance of Steen’s inquiry to science literacy studies. I broadened and altered the scope from a study of literature students’
processing of metaphor to a study of science students’
processing of analogy. Over a dozen students participated in this study, but I focused on six, three from
the calculus course described above and three from a
writing-intensive genetics course. Slightly modifying
Steen’s methodology, I asked students first to underline analogies in each of three texts and explain them
in a taped interview afterwards, and secondly to
“think aloud” as they orally read three different passages. In each of the two sessions, the underlining/
explanation session and the think-aloud/explanation
session, students responded to an excerpt from a work
of popular science written for a general audience, an
excerpt from a science text (Human Genetics) written
for college students, and an excerpt from a science
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journal written for experts in neurophysiology. My
initial question, to what degree do student readers of
science think analogically, developed into the following six questions as the interviews took place:
• Do these six students recognize as potential analogies the same linguistic structures identified by
experts?
• Do these six students process potential analogies
analogically? (That is, are potential analogies read
literally or figuratively, and, if figuratively, in what
ways?)
• Do these six students find analogies helpful in understanding the content?
• What happens when an analogy breaks down, as
most analogies eventually do?
• To the degree some analogies bridge new and old
information, how does the bridging work?
• Does analogic thinking lead to greater insight into
the nature of language?
In general, there was a wide discrepancy between
potential and realized analogies. Most of the students
only realized or reconstructed the potential analogies
when they talked or wrote about them. These students
found some analogies much more helpful than others,
but all of the students interviewed affirmed the potential instructional value of using analogic thinking
in the sciences and of having qualitative learning precede quantitative learning. And, for most students,
the interview project led them to think about the language of science in ways that had never before occurred to them. The not-so-literal dimension of language is more pervasive than most students had realized. This awareness, in turn, did lead a few students
to think about the ways in which science is “made” in
new ways, but it did not cause them to question the
value of science. These conclusions, along with the
success of the written assignments foregrounding
analogy in the calculus course, point to the value of
making deliberate use of carefully selected analogies
in the sciences.
POTENTIAL ANALOGIES

With one exception, students preferred the popular
science genre to either the text excerpts or to the technical academic articles, and they attributed their preference to the abundant images and comparisons in
the popular science writing. Students made comments
such as “It got you interested” and “That was help-
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ful; I probably wouldn’t’ve understood it [the article] CONSTRUCTED ANALOGIES
without them [the analogies]” — or “It gave me some- Although Steve was the most active reader—the most
thing concrete to hold in my mind.” In the first popu- ranging in his connections beyond those presented in
lar science excerpt, entropy was compared both to an the text—all six students constructed analogies when
engine running out of gas (a conventional analogy given an opportunity to write or talk about them.
used in most physics courses) and to a casino closing Some analogies were grounded in “potential analodown (a novel and productive analogy for all six read- gies,” those text structures that expert readers would
ers). Even when students claimed to enjoy excerpts identify as analogies; other analogies were compariwith many “potential analogies,” though, they didn’t sons between seemingly-literal information in the text
always identify the analogies as such. Five of the stu- and something in the students’ experience. For exdents rarely identified as analogies anything other ample, few students read “blind watchmaker” as
than similes or phrases that were announced by tags much other than a placeholder for an unfamiliar idea
such as “...is like.” None of the students, for example, in the think-aloud interviews, but the more they
identified “cDNA library,” “transcription,” “editing,” talked, the more they began to make sense of “blind”
or “palindrome” as part of an extended linguistic anal- and to sort through similarities and differences in the
ogy, even though they could readily identify more sonar capacity of bats (a result of chance and evoluterms in the same group once the extended analogy tion) and the sonar capacity of machines (purposefully designed by engihad been pointed out to
neers).
them. The distinction made
here between “potential”
The three calculus students
and “constructed” analo...if you force people to make analogies or have
had also just completed the
gies is affirmed by the stuan
analogy
set
up
for
them,
the
fundamental
parts
course in which they were
dents’ “monovalent” readof
calculus
won’t
be
glossed
over
so
much,
but
asked to explain in writing
ing of many conventional
an extended analogy of a
analogies (by a literal read- will be used and understood. --Steve
videotape of a tennis game.
ing of a conventional analAs indicated earlier, the
ogy). With the exception of
the same student (Steve), the undergraduates disliked professor of this course, Dennis Sentilles, compares
the technical article, which made little blatant use of calculus to an ever-changing “time-ball system.” A
function is compared to the whole videotape of the
analogy.
path of a tennis ball, and the domain of f is compared
Steve, the most advanced of the calculus students, to the length of time the ball is in flight (the number
expressed decided appreciation of analogies, but con- of frames on the videotape) and the range of f is comstructed his own analogies with or without the prompt pared to all the different positions of the ball (or all
of the “potential analogy.” As he put it, “I’d almost the frames on the videotape). All three students found
say that any time I see something that I’m familiar this approach to calculus revolutionary and construcwith, the whole index [of mind and memory] is tive. Steve, who claimed to have an intuitive underopened up, and I can pull out my file card and say, standing of the equations, found himself re-defining
ah, here’s one!” The lack of “potential analogies” in and clarifying ideas that had already made some sense
the technical article did not bother him because he to him. He found the videotape analogy indispenswas rifling his own mental files, including many “re- able and, when asked if he would teach in the manceived” analogies from other texts and lectures. He ner of Sentilles, responded, “most definitely...I think
liked the technical article precisely because it was the if you force people to make analogies or have an analmost foreign to him, because it challenged him the ogy set up for them, the fundamental parts of calcumost to construct his own analogies or to recall analo- lus won’t be glossed over so much, but will be used
gies from memory. In the genetics text excerpts, also, and understood.” That, unfortunately, is what Tom
one phrase after another would elicit an analogy not described as being the case in previous courses: “Bepresent in the text structure but present in Steve’s fore I went in there, I just got pushed through calcumemory from a drawing on the blackboard in a pre- lus, and I didn’t really learn to conceptualize it.”
Learning to think qualitatively and not just quantitavious course or from a picture in an old textbook.

❝
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tively proved to be revolutionary for him in other
courses as well. “After this course, after I started in
this course, my grades shot up because I would sit
back and look at something and say, ‘Okay, I can’t get
this, why? What are we doing?’ And after a while, I’d
say, ‘ah, that’s why!’” Mike, the third calculus student,
also said that “for me, it was the analogies that made
my understanding. I couldn’t just throw those out.”
All three of them, though, identified the writing process as the place where the received analogy started
to make full sense, where the “potential analogy” created by Sentilles became a “constructed” or “reconstructed” analogy in their own minds. Two tentative
conclusions might be drawn from this: first, potential
analogies might not offer much if students aren’t asked
to play with them, if students aren’t given the time
and resources to reconstruct them. Second, all analogies are not equally valuable: Sentilles had experimented with many other potential analogies before
settling on the time-ball analogy that proved to be
powerful for a wide variety of math students.
ANALOGIC BREAKDOWN

Steve identified “negative analogy” or inaccurate comparisons in both the genetic text and popular science
excerpts. He conceded that these limitations could
lead to misunderstanding. Instead of ending the analogy, though, he felt readers should keep extending
the analogy: “Keep re-defining, keep talking.” Here, I
would like to distinguish between those analogies that
fail because the student already possesses a more refined understanding of the concept and those analogies that are troubling, provocative. Most students
who found some analogies too simplistic simply
skipped over them. In the Human Genetics text, numerous similes were used, and some simply failed for
students who had considerable coursework in biology. For example, most students found useful a comparison of Vitamin D and a faulty receptor to a ferry
unable to dock, but advanced biology students found
other similes limited. However, if an analogy was troubling (not simplistic, but troubling), most students
found even the troubling part stimulating. Mike and
Steve both objected to some of the emotional implications of the casino analogy for entropy; neither wanted
to view entropy as something “bad” or something to
lament. Mike didn’t fault the writer, though, for an
imperfect analogy is thought-provoking, slows a
reader down: “Because if he didn’t have words in here
like that you’d just read it and go on...but then he used
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words that have a lot of different meanings, or could
have...and you have to think...and it makes you mull
it over.” In other words, the “meaningful calculus”
sought by professors such as Sentilles or the “instructive metaphor” sought by learning theorists such as
Richard Mayer comes about by gaps that motivate
new learning.
BRIDGING OLD AND NEW INFORMATION

All six students were quick to credit analogies with
getting them interested in new material. Only one of
them expressed much interest in entropy, but all of
them found the article about entropy quite interesting. It appears, though, that analogies function even
more effectively by breaking up a bridge, by creating
a hurdle, or slowing down a train of thought. In both
cases, the analogy often functioned as a placeholder,
a space for a concept that would become better understood in time. Several of Mike’s comments pointed
to still another function of analogy: a bridge not from
the unfamiliar to the familiar, but from the now-thoroughly-understood to memory. In other words, analogies can function as a way of compressing and repackaging already-understood concepts for long-term storage.
INSIGHT INTO LANGUAGE

The more I gave these six students an opportunity to
explain themselves, the more they realized that they
were dependent by degree on analogies. Put another
way, the more they tried to remove themselves from
analogic thinking, the more they realized they couldn’t
do it. They began to realize that words and concepts
are born and grow and change, and most found it
impossible to express scientific concepts in absolutely
value-free language. Many had never before thought
about the etymology of conventional vocabulary such
as “bacteria” (little staffs). Several returned to the second interview with examples of analogies they had
found in other science texts. Although students gained
insight into language, their insight was a byproduct
of their learning about something—entropy or natural selection or transcription or neural transplants.
They weren’t bashing science, but were gaining insight into it.
CONCLUSION

Writing across the curriculum (WAC) programs, such
as the one in which I work, have largely substituted a
belief in linguistic positivism (which treats language
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as if it were a transparent medium and writing skills
as if they were generalizable across all contexts) with
a belief that language can never be completely “clear,”
can never be completely rid of analogy, and, even if it
could, it shouldn’t. As scientists and humanists work
together to better understand the languages and conventions that do characterize our disciplines, we may
also better understand each other.
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